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RELIGION AND THE STATE
INTRODUCTION
GENE R. NICHOL*
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ."I Having strug-
gled with the meaning of those phrases for almost two centuries,
constitutionalists could well have been expected to have reached
something of a consensus as to their contents. But that has not
proved to be the case. Like other majestic generalities of the con-
stitutional charter-due process, equal protection, and freedom of
speech, to name only the most obvious-the religion clauses impli-
cate tensions and complexities that undermine their linguistic clar-
ity. As a result, the American law of church and state is far from
settled. It even may be the case that, as a nation, the United States
is less certain, more torn, and more confused about the meaning of
these clauses today than at any time in its past. The road ahead
may be even more hazardous than the one behind.
When this Symposium was scheduled in the spring of 1985, the
,Supreme Court was considering a half dozen or so religion cases,
and wise commentators were predicting a wholesale overhaul of the
Court's religion jurisprudence. That overhaul, if it came at all, cer-
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tainly was less than dramatic. The High Court has continued its
somewhat grudging process of exclusion and inclusion, attempt-
ing to mark the appropriate boundary between religion and
government. During the past two terms, the Court has upheld a
state financial assistance program for the visually handicapped,
even though the funds were used to study for the ministry,' and it
has sustained a number of government programs against free exer-
cise challenges.' But a public school's period of silence "for medita-
tion or voluntary prayer,"4 a state statute guaranteeing employees
the right not to work on their chosen Sabbath,5 and two separate
schemes offering public funding for teaching in sectarian schools,'
all have fallen to aggressive interpretations of the establishment
clause. Clearly, the debate concerning the appropriate separation
between church and state has not closed.
Further complicating the picture has been the reemergence of
the relationship between church and state as a politically contro-
versial topic. Attorney General Edwin Meese, perhaps bolstered by
then-Associate Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree, 7
has argued that the modern religion decisions demanding separa-
tion of church and state would have shocked the framers of the
first amendment.8 Painting in brighter tones, Secretary of Educa-
tion William Bennett characterized forty years of religion decisions
as "misguided" attempts at neutrality reflecting "an attitude that
regards entanglement with religion as something akin to entangle-
ment with an infectious disease."9 Toward the other end of the po-
litical spectrum, strong separationists have claimed that the
2. Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 106 S. Ct. 748 (1986).
3. See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986) (upholding against a free exercise chal-
lenge a requirement to provide a Social Security number to receive welfare benefits);
Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986) (sustaining Air Force dress code against
challenge by Orthodox Jew desiring to wear yarmulke while on duty).
4. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40 (1985).
5. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
6. Aguilar v. Felton, 472 U.S. 91-114 (1985); Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct.
3216 (1985).
7. 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
8. See Meese, The Battle for the Constitution, POL'Y REV., Winter 1985, at 32; see also
Taylor, Meese v. Brennan, NEw REPUBLIC, Jan. 6 & 13, 1986, at 17-21.
9. N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1985, at A18, col. 3.
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agenda of the New Right, especially the New Christian Right,1"
poses a substantial threat to democratic ideals.
No matter where one stands on this debate, one may easily con-
clude that the body of law constructed by the Supreme Court to
measure the demands of the religion clauses is unsatisfactory. The
centerpiece of the Court's doctrine-the three-part test of Lemon
v. Kurtzman" analyzing purpose, effect, and entanglement-still
stands.12 The health of that test, however, is uncertain, and its
shortcomings are well known.' 3
By its terms, Lemon casts constitutional doubt on government
action designed to serve religious goals. Despite that, the Court up-
held a state's paid chaplaincy in Marsh v. Chambers14 and a mu-
nicipal Christmas creche in Lynch v. Donnelly'5-actions consid-
ered religious in nature by most people. The "wall" the Court has
erected in the school context between appropriate accommodation
and unacceptable intermingling is anything but straight and any-
thing but solid. On occasion, the Lemon test seems in conflict with
itself, as the Court's decision last year in Aguilar v. Felton6 shows.
In that case, the school board, in taking steps to avoid the second
prong of the Lemon test by assuring that a government program
did not promote religion, initiated a program of supervision that
resulted in entanglement with religion, violating the third prong.1
7
When Lemon is not on a collision course with itself, it often
seems to conflict with the demands of the free exercise clause. If
the Lemon test prohibits the government from acting to aid reli-
gion, the free exercise clause is said on occasion to require the gov-
ernment to accommodate religious choice. Another 1985 Supreme
Court decision, Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.,18 exemplifies
10. See generally OuR ENDANGERED RIGHTS 3-71 (N. Dorsen ed. 1984) (essays on constitu-
tional processes in a democratic society).
11. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
12. The Court applied the Lemon test in both Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232, 3237-39
(1985), and Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216, 3222 (1985).
13. See, for example, Dean Choper's arguments in Choper, The Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Pirr. L. REv. 673 (1980).
14. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
15. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
16. 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985).
17. Id. at 3236-37.
18. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
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this conflict. In that case, the Court held that Connecticut's appar-
ently overzealous attempt to accommodate religion by guarantee-
ing employees a day off from work to celebrate their chosen Sab-
bath violated the establishment clause. The Court probably was
correct when it admitted that its religion doctrine "sacrifices clar-
ity and predictability for flexibility.""'
One doubts that the record of this Symposium, impressive as it
is, will solve the problems and contradictions presented by modern
American religion jurisprudence. Consensus rarely is achieved on
either political or religious issues. When the two are combined, the
chances of agreement are even further diminished. It is doubtful,
for example, that we could expect Professors Dorsen and McCon-
nell to agree on the proper relationship between church and state
no matter how long we deliberated. If we moved beyond the reli-
gion context, we would be no more realistic to expect Professors
Kurland and Perry to come to terms on the justifiable role of the
United States Supreme Court or, for that matter, to expect Profes-
sors Tushnet and Schauer to agree even on the value of doctrine.
The Articles that follow, however, do represent an impressive at-
tempt to further the inquiry.
The principal speakers, as well as the prestigious scholars who
offer comment, consider a broad spectrum of separation issues.
Professor Kurland's spirited and crisp essay explores the historical
background of the religion clauses,20 a topic much in vogue of late.
Directing our attention to the founding period, he addresses both
what can and cannot be said about the Framers' intent. Dean
Choper's excellent Article turns to the free exercise clause, propos-
ing a model for deciding such cases and criticizing the Court's work
in the area.2 Professor Greenawalt's effort puts these issues into a
somewhat broader perspective. Probing basic principles, he exam-
ines the place of religious conviction in the political decisionmak-
ing of a liberal democracy.2 2 The record of these collective deliber-
19. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980).
20. Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the Constitution, 27 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 839 (1986).
21. Choper, The Free Exercise Clause: A Structural Overview and an Appraisal of Re-
cent Developments, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943 (1986).
22. Greenawalt, The Limits of Rationality and the Place of Religious Conviction: Pro-
tecting Animals and the Environment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1011 (1986).
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ations will provide enlightenment to any serious student of the
religion clauses. It represents, as well, a source of pride for the In-
stitute of Bill of Rights Law and the College of William and Mary.
